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It was all going so well. The economyhad expanded for more than 35 consec-
utive quarters. Inflation was low, and stock
prices were high—and growing rapidly.
Consumer confidence was high, and
unemployment was low. Happiness, it
seemed, was only a dot-com away. It was
spring in the year 2000, and life, at least as
defined by the state of the economy, was
good.What has become of those exuberant
times? The answer to this question con-
tains keys to understanding today’s econo-
my and where it might be headed in the
future.
To answer the question, one must con-
sider the challenges facing the economy 18
months ago and the response of policy
makers to those challenges. Our story has
four actors: households, firms, the Federal
Reserve (Alan Greenspan’s shop), and the
government (both administration and
Congress). The challenges then were high
(and rising) financial asset prices and ris-
ing energy prices. High and rising financial
asset prices stimulate the economy by
encouraging households to spend in excess
of current income. This is the so-called
wealth effect. Rising energy prices slow the
economy by raising the costs of produc-
tion. Good policy makers know that if
spending outpaces production, then an
increase in the rate of inflation will result.
Because they lived through (or at least read
about) the 1970s, they also know that ris-
ing energy prices can engender rising
unemployment and inflation. Early in the
year 2000, there was a need for policy
action.
But by whom and when? There is really
only one answer to this question: the Fed.
Because of the delays associated with the
design and implementation of fiscal policy,
responsibility for short-run macroeconom-
ic stability has fallen on the Fed. Even
though it can act quickly, it takes 6 to 18
months for a change in interest rates to
have an impact on the economy. Inflation
was not a clear and present danger when
Greenspan and company started raising
interest rates in early 2000. Incipient
inflationary impulses and possible spend-
ing pressures as a result of the difficult-to-
measure wealth
effect provided
the justification
for the final
interest rate
increases in
spring 2000. The
conduct of mon-
etary policy requires the gumption to act
decisively and with foresight. Unfortunate-
ly, the Fed went too far.
The interest-rate increases—and a
decrease in the rate at which businesses
were willing to augment their stocks of
capital equipment and information tech-
nology—played an important role in the
diminution of exuberance. How exuberant
can U.S. households be in the face of a loss
in the value of their assets of $1.43 trillion
in the first quarter of 2001? How can firms
continue to invest when profits are 6 per-
cent lower in the first quarter of 2001 rela-
tive to the first quarter of 2000? Exuber-
ance has given way to volatility and uncer-
tainty. What is to stop the economy from
teetering over the edge into recession?
It’s not pleasant when policy mistakes
are made in real economies. Real people
lose their jobs and their homes. Good poli-
cy makers try to correct mistakes once they
are realized.
This is one interpretation of the series
of interest-rate reductions undertaken by
the Fed this year. Other things being equal,
they will buoy the economy by encouraging
households to continue their normal
spending patterns. Also, the terms on
which financial firms lend should be
relaxed as a result of the interest-rate cuts.
This may be of particular help to small
firms that depend more heavily on their
relationships with banks.
Can fiscal policy help to bring the exu-
berance back? One would think that the
recently passed $1.3 trillion tax package
would have some impact on the current
state of the economy and its prospects for
the future. By the time you read this essay,
it is likely that you will have received a
rebate check from the government of
between $300 and $600. This represents
the first segment of a tax package that is
spread over 10 years.
What did you do with that rebate? Let
me take a guess. You either (1) used it to
pay down existing debt; (2) deposited it in
your savings account; (3) spent it; or (4)
did some combination of 1, 2, and 3.
Economic theory suggests that option
(4) is more likely and that the actual frac-
tion of the rebate spent depended upon
whether you view the promise of tax relief
as being permanent or temporary. If you
thought tax relief is temporary, then you
were likely to have spent less of it.
My prediction that the tax package will
have a small (if any) impact on the current
state of the economy is based on the belief
that most of you spent only a fraction of
the rebate on newly produced goods and
services. Fiscal policy alone cannot bring
back the exuberant spring of 2000.
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Whe r e h a s a l l t h e e x u b e r a n c e g o n e ?
By Phi l ip Jefferson
Not too long ago, the economy was
flying high. Can fiscal policy and
tax breaks turn it on again?
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